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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Requisite Cause for Reopening Closed Estates
Under Section 2 (a) (8) of Chandler Act-After commencement of
garnishment proceedings by a judgment creditor, a debtor filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy, but subsequently upon his failure to deposit an
indemnity bond to cover preliminary expenses of creditors' meeting the
estate was closed by referee under Section 2 (a) (8).1 Thereupon garnishee execution was issued on the judgment. The next day the debtor
petitioned the court to reopen alleging, as his sole excuse, that he was
employed by a bank and could not get away during working hours to
attend a hearing.- Under Section 2 (a) (8), which provides for reopening
"for cause shown", the petition was allowed by ex parte order.$ On
appeal by the judgment creditor held (one justice dissenting), debtor's
petition should have been dismissed, since no "cause" justifying the reopening of the estate under Section 2 (a) (8) was shown. In re Perhnan,
16 F. (2d) 49 (C. C. A. 2d, 194o).
Generally, under old Section 2 (8)4 a court of bankruptcy would
reopen an estate only upon clear showing of non-administered assets.5
However, occasionally, in the absence of fraudulent concealment, some
courts relaxed the rule and allowed a discharged bankrupt to amend his
original schedule 6 to include names of creditors inadvertently omitted.
But where the debtor in bad faith had repeatedly failed to file the indemnity bond, the petition to reopen was denied.7 The Chandler amendment 8 to Section 2 (8)

specifically covers the latter situation and em-

i. Chandler Act §2 (a) (8), s2 STAT. 843 (1938), ii U. S. C. A. § ii (a) (8)
(Supp. 1940).
2. Chandler Act §§7 (a) (1o), 47 (a) (7), 11 U. S. C. A. §§25 (a) (to), 75 (a)
(7) (Supp. 194o).
3. The district court in which the adjudication in bankruptcy is made may, in its
liscretion, upon presentation of a verified petition, supported by affidavits, reopen an
estate by an cx parte order without notice to creditors. In re Hopkins, ii F. Supp.
831 (W. D. N. Y. z934); In re Rochester Sanitarium and Baths Co., 222 Fed. 22 (C.
C. A. ad, 1915).
4. The original subdivision of Section 2 reads: ". . . (8) Close estates, whenever it appears that they have been fully administered, by approving the final accounts
and discharging the trustees, and reopen them whencver it appears they were closed
before being fully administered." 30 STAT. 545 (1898), ii U. S. C. A. § zi (8) (1927).
5. Petitioner could show either that new assets had been discovered which debtor
did not know of at time of adjudication, Heywood-Wakefield Co. v. Small, 96'F. (2d)
496 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938) (damages for infringement of patent); In re Schreiber, 23
F. (2d) 428 (C. C. A. ad, 1928) (tax refund) ; Williams v. Rice, 30 F. (2d) 814 (C.
C. A. 5th, 1929) (balance due on judgment); In re Carrillo & Co., 20 F. Supp. 6
(S. D. N. Y. 1937) (import duties refund) ; or that bankrupt had fraudulently concealed certain assets, Schofield v. Moriyama, 24 F. (2d) 473 (C. C. A. 9th. z928);
In re Snyder, 4 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 9th. 1925) ; Chapman v. Whitsett, 236 Fed. 873
(C. C. A. 8th, 1916) ; In re Ryburn, 145 Fed. 662 (D. Conn. x9o6); In re Paine, 127
Fed. 246 (V. D. Ky. 1904); In re Meyer, ii Fed. 9o4 (D. Ore. i9o); or that the
sale of bankrupt's realty by trustee was voidable, In re Leigh, 272 Fed. 678 (C. C. A.
7th, 192) ; In re Minners, 253 Fed. 3oo (S. D. N. Y. 1918) ; In re Cook, i8 F. Supp.
687 (M. D. Pa. 1937). Where the amount to be collected was small in comparison to
the time, trouble and expense involved the court would not reopen the estate. In re
O'Connell. 137 Fed. 838 (C. C. A. ist, 19o4); In re M. E. Smith & Co., 52 F. (2d)
212 (D. Neb. 1931).
6. In re Frank, 278 Fed. 39o (D. Mont. 1922). Contra: In re Sayer, 21o Fed. 397
(N. D. N. Y. 1914).
7. In re Schildaus, 4 F. Supp. 696 (S. D. N. Y. 1933) (estate closed after repeated
failure of bankrupt to file indemnity bond; no showing of existence of assets).
8. Courts of bankruptcy may ". . . (8) Close estates, by approving the final
accounts and discharging the trustees, whenever it appears that the estates have been
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powers the court to reopen such estates, when closed for want of prosecution by the party in interest,9 "for cause shown". However, no test as to
what constitutes sufficient "cause" is stated; hence its determination must
necessarily rest within the discretion of the court.20 The instant case
invoked the exercise of such discretion by compelling a choice between two
policies: punishment of the dilatory bankrupt as a deterrent to others or
equitable distribution of available assets for the benefit of all creditors."'
In the opinion of the majority the former prevailed and the resulting
prejudice to creditors, other than the garnishing creditor, was ignored.
Seemingly this result shows abuse of discretion, particularly when contrasted with the effect given to old Section 2 (8) under which, regardless
of the bad faith of the debtor, merely nonadministration of assets would
support the petition. 2 And the instant decision may be criticized on
equitable grounds. The general creditors, even with notice of the closing
of the estate, could not have intervened since, until their claims were proved
in bankruptcy, they had no such "interest" in the estate as to support a
petition to reopen.'3 Furthermore, filing an involuntary petition in bankruptcy 14 now might be a vain gesture, for, as the dissent intimated, the

garnishment lien was reinstated 15 as soon as the stay order was vacated 1 4
and, being more than seven months old, would prevail against a subsequently appointed trustee, whose powers to set aside would be effective
only against liens attaching within four months of the second petition. 7
Thus as the only way to save the assets for equitable distribution to all
creditors, 8 the instant court could have found the requisite "cause" for
reopening the estate.
Conflict of Laws-Conversion of Property Subject to Chattel
Mortgage-Mortgagor gave plaintiff a mortgage covering cattle located in Wisconsin. Thereafter mortgagor delivered to defendant commission merchant in Minnesota two of the cattle, which were sold in the
fully administered or, if not fully administered, that the parties in interest will not furnish the indemnity necessary for the administration of the estate: and reopen estates
for cause shown. . .

9.

HANNA AND

."

See supra note x.

MCLAUGHLiN, THE

BANKRUPTCY AcT

(1939) 7, comment, §2 (a)

io. i CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. ig4o) § 248.
ii. Chandler Act § 67 (a) (i), iI U. S. C. A. § io7 (a) (i) (Supp. 1940).

12. Notes 3 and 5 supra. Where the debtor fraudulently filed a schedule of no
assets, thereby discouraging creditors from proving their claims, and subsequently the
fraud was uncovered and the estate reopened, a conflict sometimes developed between
Sectior. 2 (8) and Section 57 (n) which had provided that all claims were to be proved
within one year of adjudication. Rather than allow the debtor to reap the benefits of
his fraud the court usually allowed the creditors to prove within a reasonable time of
reopening the estate. In re Pierson, 174 Fed. i6o (S. D. N. Y. i9o9); Williams v.
Rice, 30 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929). Contra: Chapman -.. Whitsett, 236 Fed.
873 (C.C. A. 8th, 1916).
13. In re Graff, 250 Fed. 997 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); In re Meyer, i8 Fed. 904 (D.
Ore. igo).
x4. See § 59 (b) of Chandler Act, xi U. S. C. A. § 95 (b) (Supp. 194o).
15. Since the debtor was not finally adjudged a bankrupt the lien was reinstated
as of the day execution -as issued, more than seven months prior to the time the stay
order was vacated. Hence under § 67 (a) (i) of the Chandler Act it could no longer
be set aside in a subsequent independent bankruptcy proceeding.
ix U. S. C. A.
§ 1o7 (a) (0) (Supp. xg4o).
16. Dissenting opinion at 5.
17. Chandler Act §67 (a) (), i x U. S. C. A. § 107 (a) (x) (Supp. 194o).
18. Had bankrupt's estate been reopened all assets would be immunized as of date
of filing original petition. Chandler Act § 70 (a), ii U. S. C. A. § iTo (a) (Supp.
ig4o) (Note that to the time of the decision none of the assets had been administered
in bankruptcy).
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defendant's usual course of business. In an action for conversion, held,
Wisconsin law, which denies that a sale by a chattel mortgagor or his subsequent vendee constitutes a conversion,' governs. United States v.
Rodgers & Rodgers, 36 F. Supp. 76 (D. Minn. '94').
It is one of the most firmly established rules of conflict of laws that
the lav of the place of the wrong governs all substantive questions in tort
actions.2 The gist of an action in conversion is the wrongful assumption
of dominion and control over property.3 At first glance, then, since all
the operative facts took place in Minnesota which would allow a mortgagee
to maintain the action,' the instant case seems a departure from settled
doctrine. However, it is equally true that the law of the state where the
chattel is at the time of the mortgage determines the nature and extent of
the rights acquired thereunder.5 These rights should not be enhanced by
the secret removal of the chattel to another state. Under the law of both
Minnesota 8 and Wisconsin,7 the dealings with the chattel in the former
state did not enlarge the mortgagee's interest therein. Such reasoning
supports the instant court in its refusal to give the mortgagee rights in
Minnesota which he would not have had in Wisconsin. The same result
generally follows where there is an attempt by applying local law to divest
mortgages created elsewhere, though a minority of jurisdictions allow the
divestment.8 The distinction between divestment and enhancement should
not effect a difference in result. Where, as in the instant case, the existence of a tort is predicated upon an underlying contract, the reference
should be not to the law of the place of the tort, but to the law of the place
governing the obligations and rights under the contract.
Constitutional Law-Power of Congress to Regulate Wages and
Hours in Industries Producing for and Shipping in Interstate Commerce-Upon indictment for violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938,1 the defendant lumber company challenged the constitutionality
of the provisions 2 of the Act which prohibit the manufacturing for and
shipment in interstate commerce of goods produced by employees at other
than the prescribed wages and hours. Held, the provisions are within the
power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.3 United States v.
F. TV. Darby Lumber Co. et al., 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4170 (U. S. 1941).

z. Midland Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Peterson,

(1938),

52 HARV. L. REv. 525.
2. 2 B.ALr, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1935)

(1935) §378.

3. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (934)

§378;

229

Wis.

1,

281 N. W. 683

RESTATISEN/T, CONFLICT OF LAws

§ 223.

4. Close et aL. v. Hodges et a, 44 Minn. 2o4, 46 N. W. 335 (i8go) ; see Mason
City Production Cr. Ass'n v. Sig Ellengson & Co., 2o Minn. 537, 286 N. NV. 713, 715
(1939); accord, Capital Loan Co. v. Keeting et at., 219 Iowa 969, 259 N. W. 194
(1935).
5. 2 BEAr, op. cit. jupra note 2, § 265.
6. Keenan v. Stimson, 32 Minn. 377, 20 N. W. 364 (z884).
7. Midland Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Peterson, 229 Wis. 19, 281 N. V. 683
(1938).
8. W. H. Applewhite Co., Inc. v. Etheridge, 21o N. C. 433, 187 S. E. 588 (936),
i5 Nam. L. Burt± (I937) ; Bank v. Carr, 15 Pa. Super. 346 (igoo) ; General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Fowler, 36 S. W. (2d) 589 (Tex. Civ. App. z93i).
1. 52 STAT.
2. § i5 (a)

xo6o, 29 U. S. C. A. § 2o et seq. (i94o Supp.).

(0) and § i5 (a)

(2).

3. U. S. .Co-,sT. Art. I, § 8, 3. Congress is delegated the power: "To regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, .and with the Indian
Tribes."
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Congress has always been conceded the power to prohibit noxious as
distinguished from innocent articles from interstate commerce. The Court
has also recognized that Congress can in certain cases prohibit the use of
interstate commerce to promote the spread of any evil from state to state.'
Nevertheless, in 1916, Hammer v. Dagenhart5 held that Congress could not
exclude goods produced under substandard labor conditions (child labor)
from the interstate mfarket. Labor conditions in productive industries are
ordinarily subject to the police power of the states. And by writing into
the Tenth Amendment the word "expressly", 6 the Court held this field of
power to be expressly reserved to the states and thus a limitation on Congress s power over interstate commerce.7 But since goods so produced are
not noxious per se, a state could not prohibit their entry within its borders
or exit from them because a state cannot burden the free flow of legitimate
articles of commerce." Consequently, neither Congress nor the states could
effectively prevent unfair competition in the interstate market between producers in a state permitting substandard labor conditions and producers in
states held to a higher standard.9 This "no man's land" in governmental
power was partially closed by later decisions which gave to Congress the
power to subject convict-made goods, when shipped in interstate commerce,
to the law of the state where the goods are to be marketed.10 The gap is
now completely closed by the decision in the instant case which, in expressly
overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, held that the police power of the states
4. The power to regulate foreign commerce has been held to include the power to
prohibit it. United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936); University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. 48 (1933) ; The William. 28 Fed. Cas.
(16,700) 614 (i8o8). There is no reason why the same is not true of the power over
interstate commerce. See Brown v. Housan, 114 U. S.622, 63o (885).
The power
to regulate is the power "to prescribe the rules by which commerce is governed". Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i, 196 (1824) (.Marshall, C. J.). "Congress can certainly
regulate interstate commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such
commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty, or the spread of any evil
or harm to the people of other states from the state of origin. In doing this, it is
merely exercising the police power, for the benefit of the public, within the field of interstate commerce." Brooks v. United States. 267 U. S. 432, 436 (1925). The weight
of authority is that Congress can prohibit goods from interstate commerce regardless
of their nature, or regardless of the motive of Congress in so enacting. United States
v.Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. i44 (1938) ; Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v.
Illinois C. R. Co., 299 U. S. 334 (1937); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S.431 (1936);
Gooch v.United States, 297 U. S. 1z4 (1936) ; Caminetti v. United States, 24. U. S.
470 (rq6); Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (i9i6);
Hoke v.
United States. 227 U. S. 308 (1913): Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45
(i91) ; United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.. 213 U. S. 266 (1go8) ; Champion
v.Ames. 188 U. S. 32x (i9o3) ; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S.137 (19o2) ; In re Rahrer,
140 U. S. 5 (i8gi). See for an exhaustive discussion and historical analysis of the
power of Congress to prohibit, Corwin, Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce a
Crucial Constitutional Issue (1933) IS Coax. L. Q. 477. See generally, CoRWIiN., THE
CONSTITUTION AND WIIAT IT NEANs TODAY (6th ed. x938) 41-45.

5. 247 U. S. 251 (1917) (Expressly overruled by the instant case at 4172).
6. The Tenth Amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution. nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people." Justice Day in Hammer .,. Dagenhart read into this
amendment the word "expressly".

CoRwI., THE TWILIGrT OF THE SUPREME COURT

(1934) 33.
7. CoRWTx%, THE COMM[ERCE PowER vmss STATES

RIGHTS (1936) I, 18; Corwin,
Congress's Power to Prohibit Commerce: .- Crucial Constitutional Issue (1933) i8
CORN. L. Q. 477, at 482.
& Baldwin v. Seelig. 294 U. S. 511 (1935): CoRwz.x, THE CoNsTITUTION AND
WI.2AT IT IMEANS TODAY (6th ed. 1938) 43, 47, 48. "

o.Ibid.: Dickinson, The Conmerce Clatese Today (1938) Address dclhered before

the Philadelphia Bar Association. Friday. April 2..
io. Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. Ill. C. R. Co., 29 U. S. 334 (1937);
field v. Ohio, 2-97 U. S. 431 (1936).
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does not Ifmnit Congress's power over interstate commerce 11 because where
state and fedeial powers conflict, federal power is supreme.' 2 The instant
Court also 13 reiterated the now well-accepted construction of that power,
namely that federal regulation of any intrastate activity which has a substantial effect on interstate commerce is an appropriate method of regulating
interstate commerce. 1' This power is still subject to two limitations: Congress must indicate clearly what intrastate activities are to be regulated,'
and that activity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,"
In the instant case. the Court held that substandard wages and hours in
industries producing for interstate commerce do have a "substantial effect"
upon it."€ Therefore, Congress can police substandard labor conditions in
national businesses. The police power of the states over purely internal
affairs is not impaired."' Until a producer enters the interstate market or
until his activity affects interstate commerce, the power of the state over
that activity is unquestioned.29
11. Federal Trade Commission v.Bunte Brothers, Inc., 9 U. S. L Week 4201
(U. S. 1941) ; instant case at 4171; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,
9 U. S. L. Week 4o69 (U. S.1940), (194i) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 672; United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 3o4 U. S.144, 147 (1938) ; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distillers
and Warehouse Co., 25! U. S. 146, 156 (3919) ; Seven Cases of Eckman's Alterative
v.United States. 239 U. S. 51o, 514 (igis). For the fallacy of the "State's Rights"
theory of Constitutional Interpretation see CoRWivx, THE Co xERCE POWER VERSUS
STATES RIGHTS (1936).
The power of Congress over interstate commerce "is complete within itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed by the Constitution". Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. I
(1824). The "States-Rights" theorists argue the tenth amendment as a limitation. In
the early antitrust cases this was accepted but in later years was rejected. Today the
cry of States Rights is almost without support. See also instant case at 417! and cases
there cited. "The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places
no restriction and over which the courts are given no controL"
12. U. S. Co.sT. Art. VI, § 2.
13. Instant case at 4173.
14. N. L. R. B. v. Fainblatt, 3o6 U. S. 6ox (x939) ; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co.
v. N. L. R. B., 303 U. S.453 (1937) ; N. L. R. B. v.Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. I (1936). (Corwin comments that this case affords ample constitutional basis
for the recently enacted Wages and Hours Act. Coawix, TnE CONSTITUTION AND
WHAT IT .I,.ANS TODAY (6th ed. 1938).
x5. Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 9 U. S. L. Week 42ot
(U. S.194!) (Held that, in order to subject an intrastate activity to federal regulation,
Congress must clearly manifest an intention to do so in the law to be applied by the
administrative branch) (Douglas, J.. dissenting on the ground that Congress in the
Act there in question had manifested a sufficiently clear intention that the activity in
question was such an activity).
z6. Instant case at 4170n. 1, 4173. See also cases cited supra note 14. In the
preamble to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Congress stated the reasons why wages and
hours in industries producing for interstate commerce are such an activity. Of those
stated, it is submitted the following only are applicable: that substandard labor conditions (i) causes commerce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to
be used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the workers of the several
states: . . . (3) constitutes an unfair method of competition in interstate commerce;
(4)leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing interstate commerce.
17. Ibid.

-

8. See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
It must also be noted that until the federal power is exercised. the state regulations control: but if a federal law. once enacted, conflicts with
state law, the former prevails. U. S. CoxsT. Art. VI, § 2.
i9.This line of demarcation between federal and state power is not only flexible.
but practical since the power to regulate any particular activity is at all times vested
in the unit of our government most capable of exercising that power for the benefit of
the nation as a whole. "The National Government and the States constitute a single
governmental system, and hence were intended to cooperate with, rather than to frustrate, one another." CoRwix, THE COxSTITUmOx AND WHAT IT MEsxs TODAY (6th
ed. 1938) ix.
247 U. S. 251. 281 (1917).
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Corporations-Payment of Dividends out of Unrealized Appreciation in Value of Land-Trustee in bankruptcy seeks to recover
from former directors of the corporation the amount of dividends, paid out
of unrealized appreciation in the value of land. The appreciation was
based on tax assessment and amounted to 570 per cent. of the original cost
of the land, an increase from i Y to 8Y2 million dollars. The book value
of the land at all times remained below the assessed valuation. Held, this
appreciation, although unrealized, was available for dividends. Randall v.
Bailey et a, 1 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
That.cash 2 dividends may not be paid out of unrealized appreciation
in the value of a corporation's assets has been recognized as a general rule
in texts 3 and in judicial dicta, 4 although until now no court has ever been
faced with this exact issue.' The instant court found in the wording of the
statute 6 and in its historical context reason to approve the payment of such
dividends.1 In fact, however, neither of the two common types of statute,
one permitting payment of dividends only out of "surplus" or out of
"profits",' and the other, of which the New York statute is an example,,
prohibiting payment of dividends which "impair the capital" 1 of the corporation, necessarily reflects the attitude of the legislature on the question
of paying dividends on the basis of unrealized appreciation in land values.1i
The general purpose of the statutes, however, is clear, namely to preserve
I. Noted in (194i) 54 H'Av. L. REv. 505; (1940) So YALE L. J. 3o6.
2. It is probable that the courts would be less likely to frown upon a stock dividend
paid out of unrealized appreciation than upon a cash dividend, on the ground that a
stock dividend would not affect the creditors adversely, for the assets of the corporation
would not be decreased.
3. "The general rule seems to be that an increase in the value of lands held by the
corporation cannot be considered as profits, at least until such lands are sold and the
profits actually realized." iI FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (rev. ed. 1932) § 534S.
"Profits are held not to include an increase in the value of corporate property." 7
THOMPSON, CORPORATIO S (3d ed. 1927) § 5293.
4. See Southern Cal. Home Builders v. Young, 45 Cal. App. 679, 694, 188 Pac. 586,
s93 (92o); Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co., it Del. Ch. 258, 274, zoI AtI. 88, 9o4
(Ch. 1917), affd, I Del. Ch. 428, io4 Atl. 25 (Sup. Ct. 1918) ; cf. Hill v. International
Products Co., 129 Misc. 25, 46, 22o
N. Y. Supp. 711, 731 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd, 226
App. Div. 730, 233 N. Y. Supp. 78 4 (ist Dep't I9=29) ; Jennery v. Olmstead, 36 Hun
(N. Y.) 536 (1885); Dealers' Granite Corp. v. Faubion, i8 S. W. (2d) 737 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929).
5..
. . it is . . . surprising that upon a question so important to and so often

occurring in the realm of business there is, not only no decision which can be said to be
directly in point, but, also, no discussion in text-book or law magazine which does more
than pose the question without answering it." Instant case, 178-9.
6. "No stock corporation shall declare or pay any dividend which shall impair its
capital or capital stock, nor while its capital or capital stock is impaired, nor shall any
such corporation declare or pay any dividend or make any distribution of assets to any
of its stockholders, whether upon a reduction of the number of its shares or of its capital or capital stock, unless the value of its assets remaining after the payment of such
dividend, or after such distribution of assets, as the case may be, shall be at least equal
to the aggregate amount of its debts and liabilities, including capital or capital stock
at the case may be." NEW YORK STOCK CORPORATIoN LAW § 5&
7. Originally, the statute limited the payment of dividends
representing
"surplus profits from the business"; then it was changed to permittothefunds
payment of dividends from the amount calculated by subtracting the liabilities to creditors and to shareholders from the "value of its assets". Applying a meaning used in solving other problems, the court found that !'value of its assets" meant actual current value, which logically included unrealized appreciation.
8. E. g. DEL. REv. CODE (1935) § 2o66. See (194o 5o YALE L. J. 3o6, 311, n. 16.
9. See note 6 supra.
xo. E. g. N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) tit. 14, § 8-i9. See (1940) 50 YALE L. J. 3o6.
n. 14-15.

it. Some state legislatures have expressly prohibited dividend payments from un(Purdon, 1938) tit. 15, § 2852-701 (1).

realized appreciation. E. g. PA. STAT. AN-,-.
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enough assets to protect the interests of creditors and shareholders. These
interests can best be protected by retaining an excess of assets over liabilities
sufficient to neutralize cyclical variations in the market value of the assets,
and to minimize the danger that a depression in their value might cause
insolvency. 12 In usual practice, original cost approximates the value of the
benefit which the corporation will derive from its assets, and, especially
where as in the instant case the increase is in the value of property used in
producing operating income, there is unlikely to be a corresponding increase
in the benefit to the corporation as a going concern. 3 In reaching its conclusion, the instant court was influenced by the facts that the value of the
land had tremendously increased, that the revaluation by the corporation
was supported by the impartial estimate of the tax assessors, and that the
directors had acted in good faith. Furthermore, the dividends had already
been paid. It does not necessarily follow from this decision that had the
dividends not been paid, a bill to enjoin the payment would have been
unsuccessful.

Evidence-Judicial Notice of the Objectives of the Communist
Party-The Secretary of State of \Vashington refused to file the certificate of nominations of the Communist Party, although the statutory
requisites had been complied with,' on the ground that by doing so she
would violate her oath of office since it was common knowledge that the
Party advocated the overthrow of the United States government by.force
and violence.2 In an action by the state on the relation of certain members of the Communist Party for a writ of mandamus to compel certification of the Party nominees, it was held (three justices dissenting), where
election statutes are complied with, the Secretary of State has no discretion to deny the party a place on the ballot, the court will not take judicial
notice of alleged treasonable purposes of the Communist Party, especially
where they are denied.- State ex rel Huff v. Reeves, io6 P. (2d) 729
(Wash. i94o).
If the court had taken judicial notice that the Communist Party's objective was the violent overthrow of the national government, the result
12. No arbitrary standard will satisfy all situations.
The general rule that dividends may not be paid from unrealized appreciation in the value of assets is unreasonable in extreme situations. For example, if Blackacrc increased in value to fifty times
its original cost with a reasonable expectation that it would retain its increased value,
the corporation should not be forced to sell Blackacre in order to distribute a reasonable portion of the fifty-fold increment to the' shareholders.
13. "1.. . so long as an asset is being used by a going concern, its value to the
business does not change. Only in case of sale and realization of a profit will the appre-

ciation be of importance."

REITER,

PROFITS, DIVIDENDS

AND THE LAW (1926)

242.

I. There was a formal defect in the petition in that the statute required that the
certificate of nomination "shall designate in not more than five words, the party or
principle which such convention represents.... ." 6 WVASH. REv. STAT. (Remington,
Supp. 194o) § 5170-1, whereas the Communist Party declared its principles to be, "To
keep America at peace; to win economic security and prosperity for the people of the
State of Washington and the American people; to protect and maintain the Bill of
Rights and the civil liberties of the people." Instant case at 729, 730.
2. The Secretary of State defended her refusal on the basis of the formal defect
in the certificate, note r .rpra, also on the grounds that the principles stated in the certificate were not the Party's true principles, and on the theory that it would be a vain
and useless thing to admit the Communist nominees as they could not take the oath of
office. Instant case at 73o.
3. The dissenting opinion was based on the theory that it is common knowledge
that the Party advocates the overthrow of the government. Instant case at 732.
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would have been otherwise. 4 Thus the case presents a difficult and as yet
unsolved problem, for if a court takes judicial notice of the subversive
nature of a political party, it thereby establishes a precedent which overlooks the possibility of a sincere change in party principles; 1 on the other
hand, if the court demands proof in every case, it is a simple matter for
the party to remove all traces of a revolutionary character from its official

literature in order to sustain its legality.6 Despite objections, in the alien
deportation cases some of the federal courts took judicial notice that the
Communist Party advocated the violent overthrow of the government.'
The majority, however, reached the same conclusion upon evidence pro-

duced by the Department of Labor." Very few courts concluded that the
Communists had no such goal.' But the problem was simplified at the
4. This is inferable from the fact that Washington has a criminal syndicalism statute making it a felony punishable by a fine of not more than $5,ooo or ten years imprisonment or both to ". . . advocate, advise or teach the duty, necessity or propriety
of overthrowing organized government by force or violence . . . or by any unlawful
means.... ." 4 WASH. REv. STAT. (Remington, 1932) § 2563. It would be an absurdity to imply that the Court would permit the Party a place on the ballot, if by
judicial notice its members were considered felons under this law.
The dissent is entirely upon the majority opinion's refusal to take judicial notice.
5. It can hardly be doubted that a political party may change its principles or policies over a number of years. See Ex parte Fierstein, 41 F. (2d) 53, 54 (C. C. A. 9th,
193o). See also Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. iii, ii.
For the effect of judicial notice
see 9 WIGMORE, EvIDE.NCE (3d ed. 194o) § 2567.
6. That the Communist Party does not hesitate to sacrifice its principles-that is,
publicly sacrifice them-to maintain its legal status is evidenced by their reaction to the
Voorhis Act. Thus in a resolution proposed to the Party members by the National
Committee of the Party it is recommended: "That the Communist Party of the U. S.
A. . . . does hereby cancel and dissolve its organizational affiliation to the Communist International . . . for the specific purpose of remoting itself fram the temns
of the so-called l'oorhis Act.... . .
(Italics added.) BROWDaa, IXTERNATIONALISM
(t94o0

15, although in another part of the resolution it is stated: ".

.

. The Conven-

tion reaffirms the unshakable adherence of our Party to the principles of proletarian
internationalism. . . ." (Italics added.) Ibid. In another part of his pamphlet Mr.
Brow.er states the affiliation with the Communist International "..
. is the formal
organization expression of the principle of proletarian internationalism, a principle to
which the life of every Communist is unconditionally consecrated." Id. at 13.
By the same procedure the Party could remove traces of anarchism from its Constitution. by-laws. etc., in order to evade preventive statutes. See note IT infra.
7. These cases arose under a statute providing for the deportation of aliens advocating, or affiliated with any organization advocating, the overthrow of the government
by force or violence. 39 STAT. 889 (1917). 8 U. S. C. A. § 155 (1927). United States
c.r rel. Yokinen v. Commissioner, 57 F. (2d) 707 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; Ungar v. Seaman. 4 F. (2d) 8So. 81 (C. C. A. 8th. 1924) ; United States ex rcl. Fortmueller v. Commissioner, 14 F. Supp. 484. 487 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) ; Ex parte Jurgans, 17 F. (2d) 507,
51I (D. C. Minn. 1927) ; United States cx rel. Ahern v. Wallis, 268 Fed. 413 (S. D.
N. Y. 192o). Cf. however, Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d) 976, 978 (C. C. A. 5th,
193 8) and the recent case thereon in (1938) 52 HARy. L. REv. 157, in which the author
states: "No court, however, has abandoned the evidentiary aspect completely to base
its decision solely on judicial notice of the Party's policy.... ." Id. at 158.
8. United States cx rel. Fernandas v. Commissioner, 65 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933) ; Kjar v. Doak, 61 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Ex parte Villarino, 50 F.
(2d) 582 (C. C. A. 9th. 1931) ; Murdoch v. Clark, 53 F. (2d) I5- (C. C. A. 1st, 1931);
United States ex rel. Vojewvic v. Curran, ii F. (2d) 683 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; Skeffington v. Katzeff. 277 Fed. i29 (C. C. A. ist. 1922) ; Antolish v. Paul, 283 Fed. 957
(C. C. A. 7th. 1922) ; In re Saderquist. it F. Supp. 525 (S. D. Me. '935): United
States ex rel. Lisafeld v. Smith, 2 F. (2d) go (W. D. X. Y. 1924). See Note (1938)
48 YALE L J. 111. 114.

Active membership in the Communist Party was considered sufficient for conviction under state criminal svndicalisni statutes in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357
(1026) : Gitlow v. People of New York. 268 U. S. 6;2 (1925). See, however, Hemdon v. Lowry, 3o U. S. 242 (1937) ; Fiske v. Kansas. 274 U. S. 380 (1927).
9. The leading case is Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (Mass. 19--o), which held
that the Communist Party did not advocate the "overthrow" of the government. This
was reversed in Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. I29 (C. C. A. tst, 1922). Felix
Frankfurter and Zech~lriah Chafee, Jr., acted as arnici curiae in the Colyer case.
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time most of th,!se cases were decided, by the liberal use of revolutionary
language in the Party manifesto, programme and current literature.10 In
recent years the Party has made every public effort to disassociate itself
from the anarchist element apparent ten to twenty years ago,1 so that
proof of the Party's desire to overthrow the government is difficult, although perhaps not impossible.1 2 Because of this apparent change in
Party strategy, the instant court seems correct in refusing to take judicial
notice of that which is no longer easily ascertained. In this respect, the
case is in accord with the more recent deportation cases."
Labor Law-:Injunction Against Peaceful Picketing as a Violation of Freedom of Speech-Defendant. an outside union, in order to
unionize plaintiff's employees peacefully picketed his.business establishment.
An injunction was granted by the state court. On certiorari the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed (two justices dissenting),' state-court
on the grounds that the injunction violated defendant's right of free speech.
American Federation of Labor, et al. v. Suing, 61 Sup. Ct. 568 (1941).
The Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama2 held that the Fourteenth
Amendment had been infringed upon by a state's statutory pronouncement
that any and all picketing was per se unlawful. Left open until now was
the question as to whether in view of this decision a state court could grant
an injunction.3 Picketing in the absence of an immediate employer1o. Note (1938) 48 YALE L. J. 111, 114, and see also recent case in (1938) 87 U.
OF PA. L. REV. 226, 227.
ii. The 1938 Party platform reads: "The Communist Party of the U. S. A. up-

holds the democratic achievements of the American people. It opposes with all its
power any clique, group, circle, faction or party which conspires or acts to subvert,
undermine, weaken or overthrow any or all institutions of American democracy. .. "
CO.STITUTION AND BY-LAws OF TUE CoMMUNIST PARTY (1938) Art. VI, § i. Also,
"Party members found to be . . . advocates of terrorism and violence as a method
of Party procedure . . . shall be summarily . . . expelled from the Party." Id.

Art. X, §s.

Note too the proposed dissolution of the Party's affiliation with the Communist

International, note 6 mupra. See also recent case in (z938) 87 U.
227.
12.

OF

PA. L RE%.

226,

The preamble of the Party constitution states one of the Party's objectives as

. .. establishing common ownership of the national economy . . . by the establishment of socialism according to the scientific principles enunciated by the greatest
teachers of mankind. Marx, Engel. Lenin and Stalin.... ".Thismay, of course, be
eliminated by the resolution stated in note 6 supra.
Moreover, it is contended that the above changes in party policy are merely apparent. DiEs, TiE TROJAN HORSE In AMERICA (1940) 203; LA Vi, FiFTH CO.LMN Iv AMERICA (1940)

223.

13. Strecker v. Kessler. 95 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 5th. 1938), 87 U. oF PA. L
REV. 226, _2 HARM. L. Rmv- 157, (1939) 7 Go. WASii. L. REv. 534. re,'d on other

grounds. 307 U. S. 22 (1939) : United States ex rl. Fortmueller v. Commissioner, 14
F. Supp. 484 (S. D. N. Y. 1836). Cf. Herndon v. Lowry., 301 U. S.242, 261 (1936).
The instant court expresses no opinion as to the right of a party proven "subversive" to a place on the ballot. See note 4 supra. It is to be noted that the Communist Party was on the ballot in 3"3
states (including states in which there are criminal syndicalism statutes) in the 1936 elections. See Note (1937) 37 COL L. REv. 86,
OO.

i. Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts dissented on procedural grounds.
Justice Black and Justice Douglas merely concurred in the result of the majority opinion so that thereby the speculation remains as to whether or not they agreed with the
reasoning employed therein.
2. 31o U. S. 88 (194o).
See also Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. io6 (194o) ;
Senn v. Tile Layers Union. 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
3. Shively v. Garage Employees Local Union No. 44. io8 P. (2d) 354 (1940);

Suchodalski v. A. F. of L. International Bldg. Service Employees.Union, 127 N. J. Eq.
511. 14 A. (2d) 51 (194o).
Cf. Kerns Co. v. Landgraf, 16 A. (2d) 623 (N. J. i94o).
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employee dispute; though immune from federal injunction by judicial interpretation of the Norris-La Guardia Act,' has not received like protection
in all state courts. A minority of jurisdictions,5 having recognized the interdependence of economic interest between a union and the non-union shop,
sanction such peaceful picketing as being for a lawful purpose or else as a
reasonable means to a legal end." The majority 7 at times rationalized that
the right to picket belonged to the immediate employees and that outsiders
acquired merely a derivative right.' Other majority jurisdictions declared
picketing under such circumstances either to be for an unlawful purpose 9
or sociahy undesirable for breaking down a satisfactory employer-employee
relationship.10 In the presence of an anti-injunction statute the courts
merely found no "labor dispute" within the meaning of the statute." The
instant case establishes, irrespective of any statute, a limitation on the
issuance of injunctions." Though picketing accompanied by force is still
prohibited,13 peaceful picketing is no longer enjoinable per se. 4 This decision landmarks the furtherest development of the trend emphasizing the
free speech aspects of picketing." It will probably be extended to situations
in which the suppliers and purchasers of the employer become subjected
to methods of "secondary boycott".'8 In such an event the "unity of inter4. "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or condition of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee." 47 STAT. 70, § c (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (9) (Supp.
i94o) (italics ours). The New Negro Alliance, et al. v. Sanitary Grocery Co., Inc., 303
U. S. 552 (1938) (holding the general proposition that the Act was intended to embrace controversies other than those between employers and employees). For specific
application of this doctrine to picketing by outside unions in situations similar to the
instant case see cases collected in I C. C. H. x94o Labor Law Serv. I 956s.o6.
5. I TELLER, LABOR DisPUTES AND CoLLEcTIVE BARGAINING (940) § 117, at 357.
6. Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. x3o
(1927), reargument denied, 245 N. Y. 651, 157 N. E. 895 (1927).
But iee John R.
Thompson Co., Inc. v. Delicatessen and Cafeteria Workers Union, Local 410, 126 N. J.
Eq. xi9, 8 A. (2d) 130 (1939).
See also FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCnION

(x930) 26-31.

7. See I TELm, op. cit. supra note 5 at 358.
& See Simon v. Schwachman, 18 N. E. (2d) i, 4 (Mlass. 1938) (concluding, therefore, that there was no labor dispute within the meaning of the statute).
9. For one of the latest expressions of this attitude see Shively v. Garage Employees Local Union No. 44, xo8 P. (2d) 354, 358 (Wash. 194o).
to. See Keith Theatre v. Vachon, x34 Me. 392, 404, 187 At. 692, 70! (1936).
ix. For the most extreme example of this method see Adams v. Building Service
Employees Union, 197 Wash. 242, 84 P. (2d) o2i (1938), referred to in Shively v.
Garage Employees Local Union No. 44, io8 P. (2d) 354, 359 (Wash. i94o).
12. Instant case at 570: "We are asked to sustain a decree which for purposes of
this case asserts as the common law of a state that there can be no 'peaceful picketing
or peaceful persuasion' in relation to any dispute between an employer and a trade
union unless the employer's own employees are in controversy with him. . . . The
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment is not confined by the notion of a particular state
regarding the wise limits of an injunction in an industrial dispute, whether those limits
be defined by statute or by the judicial organ of the state."
x3. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, etc. v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 6i Sup. Ct. 552
(194z) (decided the same day as the Suing case and held that peaceful picketing could
be enjoined when enmeshed with previous violence).
x4. For an interesting discussion of the extent to which even peaceful picketing has
heretofore been successfully curbed by judicial ingenuity see Cooper, The Fiction of
Peaceful Picketitg (1936) 35 Micir. L. REv. 73.
15. See note 2 Sipra.
to. Instant case, at 570: "The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not
in his employ. Communication by such employees of the facts of a dispute, deemed by
them to be relevant to th.-ir interests, can no more be barred because of concern for the
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est" requirement becomes an obsolete test. 7 While the court does limit
its decision to "workingmen", 8 the definition of which may provide a loophole for recalcitrant jurisdictions, the further interesting speculation remains as to the possible extension of the general doctrine into the field of
non-labor disputes.

Labor Law-Legality of Union Activity in Jurisdictional Disputes-Defendant union officials, in the course of a dispute with
another union, called a strike against and picketed the employer, picketed
employer's adjoining tenant, forbade members from working on construction for tenant and employer respectively, and advertised employer nationally as unfair. These acts allegedly restrained interstate commerce by
hindering receipt and shipment of goods, in violation of the Sherman Act.
Held 2 (two justices dissenting and one concurring on other grounds), no
offense charged under the laws of the United States. United States v.
Hutcheson,8 6i Sup. Ct. 463 (U. S. '94i).
The Clayton Act' apparently legalized in federal jurisdictions many
union activities previously enjoinable and indictable under the Sherman
Act. But in Duplex Co. v. Deering,5 the Supreme Court held that interstate union activity against third persons (the employer's customers), was
still enjoinable, as the Clayton Act legalized only activity directly against
the employer.6 The Norris-LaGuardia Act,7 without purporting to affect
criminal jurisdiction, then further limited the power of federal courts to
enjoin labor activities. By virtue of this, the secondary boycott (acts against
third persons) s is no longer enjoinable. 9 And the Supreme Court has
usually rejected the contention that interference with interstate commerce
resulting from intrastate activities against the employer, is sufficiently
direct to violate the Sherman Act.10 These activities are held, even where
economic interests against which they are seeking to enlist public opinion than could the
utterance protected in Thonrhill' case.". (First italics added.)
Query: would this permit a union to circulate a blacklist among those who do business with the employer in question "requesting" such persons not to deal with said
employer?
i7. Goldfinger v. Feintuck, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 9o (1938); REsTATE.ENT, TORTS (1939) § 799, comment b.
18. Instant case, at 570: "A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully
exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those
directly employed by him."

(Italics added.)

r. 26 STAT. 209 (i8go), x5
2. Mr. Justice Frarkfurter

U. S. C. A. § i.
wrote the majority opinion, Mr. Justice Stone the con-

curring, and Mr. Justice Roberts the dissenting opinions. The Chief Justice joined in
the dissent.
3. This case has been noted in (794i) 54 HARV. L REv. 887.
4. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. (1927) §5.z
5.

254

U. S. 443 (1921).

6. For an account of the treatment of the Clayton Act by the Courts, see FPANErFURTFR AND GREENE, THE LAOR INJuNcToi
(1930) 165 et seq.
7. 47 SrAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp. ig4o) § xor-iS.
8 ". . . a combination to influence A by exerting some sort of economic or social
pressure against persons who deal with A......
FRANFURTER AND GRRENE, op. cit.

supra note 6, at 43.
9. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 371 U. S. 91

(1940).
10. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103
Workers v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457 (1924).

(1933);

United Leather
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attended with lawless conduct, to involve merely local disputes.". The
instant case lies between the Duplex case enjoining interstate secondary
boycotts, and the refusal to apply the Sherman Act to intrastate activities.
The majority conceded arguendo that the Duplex case should apply, if it
were not for the Norris-LaGuardia Act. They found it anomalous to deny
injunctive relief against certain activities, yet permit the government to
prosecute them criminally, especially when the Act removing injunctions
expressed a policy to aid labor in its unequal contest with capital. 12 They
interpreted the Clayton Act in the light of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to
legalize secondary boycotts generally." The concurring opinion, however,
and that of the court below, 14 felt that the charges involved, withl one exception, no more than the usual local dispute. It reasoned that the secondary boycott being wholly intrastate, was analogous to other local activities in which any hindrance to interstate commerce is too remote to fall
within the Sherman Act.' 5 The exception was the national boycott but
being against the employer, this was legal even under the Duplex case. The
dissenting opinion did not distinguish between inter- and intrastate boycotts, and felt that under the Duplex holding, there had been a violation of
the Sherman Act. On the critical point involved, i. e., the presence of a
jurisdictional dispute, one between unions rather than between union and
employer, all justices agreed that since the Clayton Act did not draw distinctions based on motives, the court would' not do so. In view of doubt as
to the applicability of the Sherman Act to the instant charges, the dissenting opinion is to be criticized. It would reverse for this purpose, the rule
of strict construction of a criminal statute in favor of the accused.'
At
the same time, the majority's position is by no means beyond scrutiny. Congress may have intended to deprive employers of the injunctive weapon
because of possible abuses, yet to retain to the government the threat of
crim.nal prosecution of labor, where the disputes warranted. The reasoning of the majority, involved, according to the dissent, a novel technique in
construction. The result could have been attained, as ably shown by the
concurring opinion, on narrower and more precise grounds, there being
ho call for using this case to inaugurate sweeping changes in methods of
statutory construction.
Mortgages-Validity of Second Lien Given Creditor Who Has
Accepted H. 0. L. C. Bonds in "Full Settlement" of Claim-Debtor
obtained a loan from H. 0. L. C. to refinance a debt to creditor secured
by a deed of trust. In an instrument entitled "consent to take bonds" the
creditor agreed to accept H.O.L.C. bonds "in full settlement of the claim."
As the face value of the bonds was $3o0 less than the original debt, creditor required debtor to execute a note secured by a second trust deed for
this amount. Debtor sued to cancel the note and second lien. Held (one
judge dissenting). the note was not discharged by the "consent agreement" nor was it void as against public policy. Shivers v. Liberty Building-Loan Ass'n et al., io6 P. (2d) 4 (Cal. i94o).
ixi. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469 (i94o); United Leather Workers
v. Herkert, 265 U. S. 457 (I924).
12. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp. i94o) § iO2.

13. See dissenting opinion of the late Mr. Justice Brandeis in Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921) at 486. Cf. also, Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, i56 Cal. 70,
io3 Pac. 324 (igog) : Empire Theatre Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183, 163 Pac. 107 (1917).
14. 32 F. Supp. 6oo (E. D. Mo. i94o).
i5. See cases cited note xi supra.
16. This fundamental principle was recognized by the Supreme Court as early as

i82o in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 8_.
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In the ca, e of Mc.4llistcr v. Drapcau' this court adopted the majority
rule;- and held that such a creditor's "consent agreement" was an accord
and satisfaction s of his entire claim ' and as such released.the debtor from
any collateral agreement creating a second lien, and that a second lien
created without a full disclosure to H. 0. L. C. was void as against public
policy.- Since in the instant case the evidence showed that the "consent
agreement" was only one of several instruments included in creditor's
escrow instructions and that these instructions included positive demands
for the second lien as part consideration for the release of the original
debt,' it is evident that the creditor did not intend the "consent agreement" to be an accord and satisfaction of the entire transaction.' However the creditor's testimony that he had discussed the second lien with an
"individual" 8 in the Home Loan office, which the court accepted as proof
of full disclosure, falls short of that formerly required in majority jurisdictions.' Such courts have consistently .held that where the disclosure fails
to present facts from which the H. 0. L. C. could determine the advisability
of the second lien that it should be void as against public policy even
though no actual hardship is shown, 0 as the H. 0. L. C. regulations 1 allow
second liens on property refinanced by them only when their investigation
i. McAllister v. Drapeau, 14 Cal. (2d) o2, 92 P. (2d) gzu (x939).
2. Note (194o) 38 MicH. L R-v. 5o8, 5o, where it is stated ".
. the case of

McAllister v. Drapeau . . . erases from the judicial slate the single dissent from
the proposition that such collateral agreements are unenforceable unless there is' a
proper disclosure to H. 0. L. C . . ." Contra, McMillan v. Palmer et al., I98
Ark. 8o5, 131 S. W. (d) 943 (1939).
3. RESTArEMENT, CoNMAcrs (1932) §§ 417, 421.
4. For a complete discussion of the majority view of the contractual relations
involved, see Payne, Enforceability of Agreements between Mortgagors of the Home
Otners Loan Corporation and Third Parties (1939) 45 W. VA. L Q. 332.
S. (x94o) 28 CArIF. L Ray. 232; Cook v. Donner, 145 Kan. 647, 66 P. (ad)
587 (I937); Meek v. Wilson, 238 Mfich. 679, 278 N. W. 731 (1938y; Anderson v.
Horst, 132 Pa. Super. 140, 2oo AtI. 72z (1938). Other courts have refused to enforce agreements of this nature on the ground that the release is a false statement
in violation of § 8 (a) of the Act which states that "whoever makes any statement,
knowing it to be false . . . for the purpose of influencing the action of" the H. 0.
L C. "shall be punished . .. ," 48 STAT. 134 (1933), i2 U. S. C. § 1467 (a) (1934),
Jessewick v. Abbene, 154 Misc. 768, 277 N. Y. Supp. 599 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1933).
6. Instant case at 5.
7. The dissenting judge argued that the parol evidence rule prohibited the introduction of any evidence of the creditor's intent which would vary the terms of
the written contract between himself and the H. 0. L. C. See instant case at 7 (dissenting opinion). Where, as here, the collateral agreement was between parties other
than those contracting in the "consent agreement" it is perhaps questionable whether
the evidence should have been admitted. For a tatement and discussion of the parol
evidence rule see 3 WxmiLSro-, CoxTRAcrs (rev. ed. 1936) §631.
8. Instant case at _.
g See instant case at 8 (dissenting opinion) ; Council v. Cohen, 21 N. E. (ad)
967, 968 (Mass. 1939) where evidence that the creditor's attorney ". . . communicated with some one connected with the corporation with respect to the second mortgage, . . ." was held not sufficient proof of disclosure. Bridewell, Validity of
Second Mortgages in H. 0. L. C. Refinancing (1940) 5 JoHN MARSMALt L Q. 373,
381, where it is said to be questionable whether disclosure to "an employee who had
no authority to act" would be sufficient authority. In the instant case it should be
noted that there was no proof that the "individual" contacted had authority to act.
lo. The majority contends that one of the most effective means of giving relief
is to secure a reduction of their indebtedness by offering to mortgagees a smaller
sum in marketable bonds, and to pass this saving on to the debtor. Chaves County
Building and Loan Ass'n v. Hodges, 40 N. M. 326, 59 P. (2d) 671 (1936); Anderson v. Horst. 132 Pa. Super. 140, 2oo Atl. 721 (1938); (194o) 25 CoaN. L Q. 0;
(1939) 52 HARv. L. REv. 842.
rf. 48 STAT. z28, i32 (1933) 12 U. S. C. § 1463 (K) (1934) gives the "Corporation power to make such . . . rules and regulations . . . as may be necessary
for the proper conduct of the corporation."
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has shown that such a lien will not cause the debtor an added hardship
or otherwise defeat the purpose of the act.12 The minority argues that the
H. 0. L. C. was not intended to reduce the home owner's debts but only to
refund them on more convenient terms and that as long as no fraud, duress, or hardship is shown, the second lien should be allowed to stand."
This would seem to be the more desirable rule and the court in the instant
case by holding on the least possible evidence that the defendant had
made a full disclosure 14 on the one hand, and looking to the absence of
hardship on the other, appears to be honoring the majority rule but applying the minority. This decision may be taken to indicate a tendency of
the courts to accept the minority view which will perhaps be accelerated
as economic conditions improve and the courts lose their enthusiasm for
aiding the debtor class at the expense of creditors.

Taxation-Power to Tax Dividends Issued Outside State From
Earnings Within State-A Wisconsin statute imposed a tax on "the
privilege of declaring and receiving dividends out of income derived from
property located and business transacted in this state .... " I A Delaware
corporation, which did business in the state, declared dividends in New
York payable by checks drawn on New York banks. Wisconsin taxed
that portion of the dividends which was earned within Wisconsin. Held,
(four justices dissenting) the tax did not violate due process.2 Wisconsin
v. J. C. Penney Co., 9 U. S. L. WEEK 4o65 (U. S. ig4o).A state may tax income earned within it by a non-resident person' or
foreign corporation.? Likewise a franchise tax levied on a foreign 4orporation's income from sources within the state is proper. 6 But a tax on activities outside the state is improper.? The court construed the instant statute as a supplementary income tax, and rejected the theory 8 that the tax
12 U. S. C. § 2463 (2934) where the title of the Act
12. 48 STAT. 128 (1933)
states that its purpose is "to provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness . . ." See also the case of United States v. Kay, 89 Fed. (2d)
19, 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) where it is said "The purpose of the act was not to
induce the unloading of mortgages on the United States by way of obtaining a better rate of interest . . . but to relieve the distress of foreclosure."
13. McMillan v. Palmer, 198 Ark. 8o5, 132 S. W. (2d) 943 (x939); McAllister
v. Drapeau, 85 P. (2d) 523 (Cal. App. 1938), rev'd in 14 Cal. (2d) 102, 92 P. (2d)
911 (1939).
14. See note 9 sulpmr.
I. LAWS OF WIS. (1935) c. 505, 3.
2 This reversed the holding of the

Wisconsin Supreme Court to the effect that the
tax was invalid as applied to locally licensed foreign corporations which declare dividends outside the state. J. C. Penney Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 233 Wis. 286,
298 N. W. 677 (294o) 88 U. OF PA. L. RE'. 1025.
3. In the companion case of Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co.,
9 U. S. L. WEEK 4o68 (U. S. x94o), it was held that this tax did not violate the commerce clause.
4. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (i92o) ; New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves.
299 U. S. 366 (x937).
5. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); cf. U. S.
Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (i928).
6. Equitable Life Society v. Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 143 (1915).
7. Union Refrigerator Co. v. Kentucky, igg U. S. 194 (xgo5).
8. For a statement to the effect that in considering the constitutionality of a tax
the court is concerned "only with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it", see Lawrence v. State Tax
Commission of Mississippi, 286 U. S. 276, 280 (1932). "In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect."
Henderson v. Mayor of New York. 92 U. S. 259, 268 (1875).

RECENT CASES

was upon the act of declaring dividends. The legislative background of the
taxing statute ind.cates clearly that the court's interpretation was correct.'
The tax is an additional tax on the corporation's earnings within Wisconsin. The amount to be paid is ascertained when dividends are declared;
the liability to pay is postponed until the Wisconsin earnings are paid out
in dividends. In the instant case the dividends were clearly paid from
profits made in Wisconsin, and must be distinguished from cases where the
tax did not fall on earnings from within the state, either in incidence or
measure.' 0 This justifies the earlier Wisconsin holding that the tax was
valid because the earnings had a "constructive situs" in Wisconsin.2 1 Even
if the instant statute were not held to be an income tax, it might be argued,
by analogy to the "business situs" principle as applied to property taxes,
that where funds are earned within a state, they have a situs therein for
taxation. 12 The earnings, being accumulated under the protection of Wisconsin, can be justifiably taxed upon the same theory that permits taxation
of an intangible in every state whose laws offer protection thereto.1 '

Taxation-Privilege Tax on Sample Displays by Non-Residents
as Burdening Interstate Commerce-Plaintiff, a New York retailer,
paid under protest a North Carolina tax I imposed on non-resident merchants who temporarily display samples within the state. Held, the tax is
unconstitutional since it discriminates against interstate commerce.2 Best
& Co.. Inc. v. Maxwell. 61 Sup. Ct. 334 (1941).
9.Although the general income tax of Wisconsin reaches non-residents, there is
no safeguard that it is reaching all taxable income derived from business carried on in
that state. The state can better reach all taxable income, by taxing the corporation
which is the source; this is especially true of non-resident shareholders who receive
dividends. The instant tax is supplementary to the general income tax, since the shareholder is permitted to deduct the amount of the instant tax from the amount which is
subject to the general income tax. This also removes all questions of multiple taxation.
See i C. C. H. TAX SEav. fi o-3o2, z5-oo (Wis. 1939) ; (194o) 88 U. OF PA. L Rev.
1025, 1026, n. &,6.
1°. In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77 (1938),
California licensed a Connecticut insurance company to do business within the state,
which company executed reinsurance contracts with other insurance companies in California protecting them against loss on policies they had written. It was held that
California could not impose a tax on the premiums received under these contracts of
reinsurance. But in this case the contract of reinsurance was not incidental to the
earnings of the company from business engaged in within the state, and thus can be
distinguished from the instant case.
ii. State cx tI. Froedtert Grain & Malt Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 22
Wis. 225, 26; N. NV. 672 (936).
12. The imposition of an ad valorein tax has been permitted upon a corporation's
bank deposits located outside the state because it was considered that the deposits had
a business situs within the taxing state. W\'heeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S.193
(T936) 21 Mixx%.. L. REv. 114. In Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., 87 Fed. (2d) 567
(C. C. A. 8th, 1937), a Delaware corporation, which kept its funds in a New York
bank, but had its principal office in ,Missouri, was held to have a tax situs in Missouri.

so that 'Missouri might tax its bank deposits in New York. Likewise, it has been held
that a state in which a foreign corporation has its "commercial domicile" can properly
place a tax upon stock held by the foreign corporation in banks of other states, because

these intangibles have a "business situs" in the taxing state. First Bank Stock Corp.
v. Minnesota, 3oi U.

S. 234 (1937) 22 Mx,.x. L. REv. 121.
13."
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U. S. 357 (1939) 24 NMfi-x. L REv. 136.

For a treat-

ment of this case from the point of view of double taxation see (1939) 88 U.
REv. i2o.

7. N. C. CotE ('Michie, 1937 Supp.) §788o (5x)e.
U. S. Co.vsr. Art. I, § 8.
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Ever since Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District,; courts have
maintained that state taxes may not directly burden interstate commerce.'
However, recent decisions upholding the validity of use5 and sales I taxes
applying equally to goods involved in the flow of interstate business and to
those in local commerce, have restricted this limitation. Moreover, three
members of the Iresent court 7 have indicated that there is no constitutibnal
objection to a state's impartial taxation of interstate commerce and the sole
restriction on possible multiple taxation lies in legislation by Congress. The
instant case does not mark a retrenchment in the current trend of expanding
state taxing jurisdiction. Looking behind the words of the statute,8 it is
obvious that the practical effect would be a reservation of the home market
by means of a tariff barrier masquerading as a license tax. The instant
case is significant in that it clearly delimits the extent of a state's privilege
to tax interstate commerce to those situations where it will work no discrimination against the non-resident. Hence, the Supreme Court in reversing the North Carolina decision 9 is not departing from its modern
tendency to effect a balance between compelling interstate commerce to pay
its own way,10 and at the same time protecting it from bearing the burden
of competitive disadvantage.1 1
3. Robbins v.Taxing District of Shelby County,

120 U. S. 489 (1887).
4. Real Silk Hosiery Mills Co. v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325 (1925) ; Hale v. Bimco
Trading Co., 306 U. S. 375 (1939) ; Refining Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346 (1917);
Grambling v. Maxwell, 52 F. (2d) 256 (D. C. N. C. 1931); City of W\aseca v. Braun,
-06 .Minn. 154, 288 N. W. 229 (x939) ; State v. Yetter, 192 S. C. 1, 5 S. E. (2d) 291
(1939).

5. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577 (1937) ; Monamotor Oil Co. v.
Johnson, 29z U. S. 86 (1934).
6. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U. S. 33 (94o); O'Kane
v. State, 283 N. Y. 439, 38 N. E. (2d) 905 (194o).
7. See justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglass, dissenting in McCarrol v. Dixie
Greyhounds Lines, Inc., 309 U. S. 176, i89 (ig4o).
8 "'Every person, firm, or corporation, not being a regular retail merchant in the
State of North Carolina, who shall display samples, goods, wares, or merchandise in
any hotel room, or in any house rented or occupied temporarily, for the purpose of
securing orders for the retail sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise so displayed,
shall apply for in advance and procure a state license from the commissioner of revenue for the privilege of displaying such samples, goods, wares, or merchandise, and
shall pay an annual privilege tax of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00), which license
shall entitle such person, firm or corporation to display such samples, goods, wares, or
merchandise in any county in this state."
9. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 216 N. C. i4, 3 S. E. (2d) 292 (1939).
to. Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434, 438 (1939); Lockhart, Tie Sales Tax in Interstate Commrce (1939) 52 HARv. L REv. 617.
ii. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875); see Warren & Schlessinger, Sales
and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays Its Vay (1938) 38 Cot- L. REV. 49.

